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Abstract—Many smartphone apps routinely gather various
private user data and send them to advertisers. Despite recent
study on protection mechanisms and analysis on apps’ behavior,
the understanding about the consequences of such privacy losses
remains limited. In this paper we investigate how much an adver-
tiser can infer about users’ social and community relationships
by combining data from multiple applications and across many
users. After one month’s user study involving about 200 most
popular Android apps, we ﬁnd that an advertiser can infer
90% of the social relationships. We further propose a privacy
leakage inference framework and use real mobility traces and
Foursquare data to quantify the consequences of privacy leakage.
We ﬁnd that achieving 90% inference accuracy of the social and
community relationships requires merely 3 weeks’ user data.
The discoveries underscore the importance of early adoption of
privacy protection mechanisms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The huge success of smartphones is largely fueled by the
availability of millions of phone apps that provide functions
covering all aspects of our lives. A large portion of these apps
are free. Their developers get ﬁnancial support from adver-
tisers by embedding their advertisement libraries to display
mobile advertisements to users. Many advertisers exist and
some of the major players include Google, DoubleClick and
AdMob [1], [2]. To gain better understanding of user habits
and behaviors for accurate ad targeting, these apps customarily
scavenge private user data, ranging from the phone’s IMEI
number, MAC addresses of nearby access points, the user’s
location, even the contact list, and send it to advertisers [3],
[4]. Ultimately, these “free” apps are not entirely free: users
pay the price of their privacy.
There has been quite some recent work that investigates
the privacy leakage and potential defense mechanisms. Taint-
Droid [3] can track the ﬂow of different kinds of private infor-
mation (e.g., IMEI, location) within an app and log the leaking
of such information through network interfaces. Barrera et
al. [5] and Felt et al. [6] examined permissions requested by
about 1,000 apps and found requests for unnecessary permis-
sions commonly exist. A number of tools [7], [8] can help
users manage permissions granted to apps such that they do
not have access to certain private information. Sowayway [9]
and Kirin [10] can detect over-privileged apps or identify
requests of dangerous combinations of permissions. Agarwal
et al. [11] proposed a crowdsourcing based mechanism to help
users decide proper privacy settings for iOS apps.
In this paper, we seek to answer an important but different
question: how much does the advertiser know about the user, in
particular, her social and community relationship (e.g.,family,
colleagues and friends) from the leaked private data? This is
motivated by a couple observations. First, there is only limited
study of apps’ dynamic leakage behavior at run-time. Existing
study [4]–[6], [9], [12]–[14] is mostly on the static aspects of
apps’ permissions. TaintDroid [3] and D2Taint [15] can be
used to log the leaking activities but the papers did not focus
on a systematic study on the destinations, frequencies and
types of apps’ run-time privacy leakages. Second, the conse-
quences of such leakage, especially when an advertiser gathers
such private data from many users and across many apps, is
not known either. It is easy to conjecture that the advertiser
may gain additional information when cross-examining private
data, but exactly what can be learnt, remains an open issue.
We focus on one important aspect of that perspective, the
social and community relationships of a user, such as her
family, colleagues and friends. Such knowledge is an important
channel for the advertiser to push relevant advertisements since
people tend to take note on things their acquaintances have
done (e.g., bought). For example Facebook has largely relied
on people voluntarily publicizing such relationship. However,
many real world relationships are not publicized online yet
they are equally important to advertisers; and there is a trend
for Facebook users of various age groups to go for other
“small-circle” social networks, or become less and less active
due to privacy concerns [16].
In particular, we quantify to what extent an advertiser can
learn and infer users’ relationships by developing a privacy
leakage inference framework. Our systematic study on privacy
leakage inference involves both real experiments with multiple
volunteers as well as trace-driven studies with human mobil-
ity traces obtained from two data sets, namely MIT reality
trace [17] and Foursquare trace [18]. By examining the privacy
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leakages of participants from a diverse background ranging
from academia to city environments (i.e., our real experiments
and the MIT trace are academia whereas the Foursquare trace
represents a city environment), we discover that the privacy
leakage enables an advertiser to infer a signiﬁcant portion of
a user’s real world relationships that have physical interactions.
Speciﬁcally, we make the following contributions:
• We conduct a manual study of the frequencies, destina-
tions and types of the run-time privacy leakages of nearly
200 most popular apps across 19 categories in Google
Play. We discover that major advertisers can easily gather
all types of private data in short time from many users.
• We model the relationship inference process in a three-
layer framework and deﬁne the concept of connection,
which is exempliﬁed by two users sharing similar patterns
in their leaked data (e.g., common Wi-Fi access points).
We conduct a one-month real experiment of 10 partici-
pants of family, colleague and friend relationships, using
various apps in their daily lives. We ﬁnd that by aggre-
gating data across users and apps, an advertiser can infer
over 90% of the relationships from the “connections”.
• We further propose two models, Activeness Based Proﬁle
and Probability Based Proﬁle, for users’ temporal privacy
leakage proﬁles based on the experimental study. To
verify the generality of ﬁndings from the real experiments
based on privacy leakage inference, we conduct trace-
driven studies by populating the derived user proﬁles to
the human mobility traces in the MIT reality [17] and the
Foursquare datasets [18]. We ﬁnd that the advertiser can
infer 80-95% of a regular user’s relation in academia and
city environments after gathering only 3 weeks of private
data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we present
an overview of our approach in Section II and describe the
run-time privacy leakage study in Section III. We deﬁne the
relationship inference framework and the connection concept,
conduct experimental study, and propose the privacy leakage
proﬁles in Section IV. In Section V, we conduct trace-driven
evaluation of relationship inference using MIT and Foursquare
datasets. We put our work into the context of the related work
in Section VII. Finally, we conclude in Section VIII.
II. APPROACH OVERVIEW
To facilitate the understanding on the consequences of
privacy leakages, we take a four-step approach: run-time
privacy leakage study, privacy leakage inference framework
construction, experimental study and proﬁle modeling, and
inference framework evaluation via trace-driven study, as
depicted in Figure 1.
From the advertiser’s perspective, we study two types of
relations: social relationship and social community. The social
relationship is deﬁned as a pair-wise relationship between two
users with certain kind of physical interactions such as col-
leagues, families, and friends (not virtual friends from online
social networks). Whereas a social community involves more
than two users, who usually appear at a location during the
same time period for certain common interests. For example,
a group of students taking the same class twice every week or
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Fig. 1. We take a four-step approach to understand the advertiser’s perspective
on users’ social and community relationships.
people eating in the same restaurant every Tuesday. We believe
identiﬁcation of both kinds of relationships help advertisers
design better targeted advertising strategies.
Run-Time Privacy Leakage Study. First we want to sys-
tematically study the destinations, frequencies and types of the
leaking behavior to understand the ﬂow of common practice of
privacy leakages in apps. We study their spatial and temporal
privacy leakage characteristics to complement the existing
work, which focuses on static aspects of permissions [7], [14],
[19], or provides the capability of logging the leakage but stops
short of a systematic study [3]. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ)
study [20] in 2010 investigated the types of leakages for about
50 most popular apps, but not destinations and frequencies,
and it was a bit outdated given the fast pace of the mobile
market. Thus we conduct a series of experiments over a two-
month period to obtain the most up-to-date picture of privacy
leakages.
After manual testing of 190 most popular apps from 19
categories in Google Play (i.e., the largest Android application
market), we ﬁnd that major destinations commonly receive dif-
ferent types of private data from multiple apps, including ge-
ographical locations (GPS-location, network-based location),
personal identities (phone number, IMEI), and communication
information (contact list). We also ﬁnd changes in the types
of leakages for about half of the apps studied in [20].
Privacy Leakage Modeling. To understand the conse-
quences of privacy leakages when an advertiser combines the
data received from different users, we develop a three-layer
privacy leakage inference framework (as depicted in Figure 1)
including Privacy Leakage Aggregation, User Connection
Derivation and Relation Inference.
We introduce an important concept connection, which exists
when two users share similarities in leaked data. The con-
nection helps bridge the gap between raw privacy leakage
data and higher level relationship inference. The intuition is
that each type of particular relationship has certain temporal-
spatial patterns in users’ physical interactions, which can be
captured by connection. For example, two family members
usually stay together at home during late night and early
morning; while classmates encounter each other frequently
in classrooms during the daytime of weekdays. Although
exceptions to such patterns exist, it can usually identify most
relationships and is the standard practice widely adopted in
social community inference [21], [22].
We further conduct an experimental study of 10 participants
for over one-month time period. Their privacy leakages are
captured and analyzed. We ﬁnd that an advertiser can infer
over 90% of the pairwise relationships by using connections
(e.g., IMEI and GPS location). Furthermore, we observe that
the temporal-spatial similarities between people who have
friend relationship is not as regular as that between people
of other relationships that have repetitive interactions (e.g.,
colleagues and families).
Evaluation of User Privacy Inference. To understand
whether the above observations can be generalized to larger
scale user population with various backgrounds, we extract
user privacy leakage proﬁles, apply them to user mobility
traces generated from two datasets with over 500 participants.
We verify that using 3 weeks of private data, an advertiser
can infer colleague-based relationships of regular users at
around 90% accuracy in an academia environment, and friend-
based relationships above 95% in a city environment. When
an advertiser uses hierarchical clustering to infer social com-
munities, 80− 90% of those of regular users’ are revealed in
academia environments, and over 80% in a city environment.
III. RUN-TIME PRIVACY LEAKAGE STUDY
Current smartphone operating systems only have coarse-
grained control on whether an application can access users’
private data [13]. For example, Android controls the access
through the install-time permission system [23]. Once the
access is granted, the application is free to access it as
frequently as possible and send it to wherever it wants over
the Internet [1], [3], [9].
The most similar study to ours is the WSJ one [20] in
2010, which focuses on 5 privacy leakage types (i.e., contacts,
location, phone id, and phone number) among 50 most popular
apps from Google Play. The results are interesting but there
is no analysis on the frequencies and destinations of privacy
leakages. Our study aims to provide a more comprehensive and
up-to-date analysis including the frequencies and destinations
of the leakages. We also investigate how much private data
an advertiser can collect and aggregate from multiple apps.
This helps the user understand the scope and extent of privacy
leakages when running apps; it also serves as the basis for
the formulation of the privacy leakage inference in the next
section.
A. Methodology
We choose the top 10 most popular applications from each
of the 19 categories in Google Play as of January 2013,
totaling 190 applications. We expect that these most popular
apps are installed by the majority of users, thus their behavior
analysis is representative to the majority of users. To analyze
the apps’ behavior, we developed a tool leveraging certain
capabilities of TaintDroid, which helps to track and log the
privacy leakages of the applications. Some of the apps crash
during the test, and we are able to gather complete results
for 145 apps. We use two types of Android phones, Google
Nexus One and Google Nexus S. To capture the application’s
behavior at different times in a day, we test about 4-5 apps in
three different time periods (i.e., morning, noon and night) in
each day. During each period, the selected apps are tested one
at a time (i.e., we reboot and uninstall each application after
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Fig. 2. Privacy leakage counts of destinations that collect private data from
more than one app during one-day testing.
testing it) for about 5 minutes. This procedure helps to avoid
interference between applications.
B. Findings
Per App Privacy Leakage. During our study, we ﬁnd that
about 50% of the apps in the WSJ report have changed their
privacy leakage behavior. In particular, we ﬁnd that 97 out
of the 145 applications send out private data of the user. The
data includes GPS location, network-based location (provided
by Android based on cellular ID and Wi-Fi networks), WiFi
Access Point SSID list, contact list, phone number, Interna-
tional Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI), accelerome-
ter readings, but not those of microphone, camera and text
message log, which are accessed by the applications but
not leaked out. We also ﬁnd that there are 8 applications
sending Wi-Fi SSID list (scanned by the smartphone) through
SSL, and 3 of the 8 applications (i.e., Compass, CNN App,
Yelp) send this information to the same destination (with
IP address 173.194.73.104 belonging to Google according to
www.iplocation.net). This type of WiFi AP list is most likely
the company’s effort to build a WiFi address database for geo-
location purposes [24]. It could be employed to infer the user’s
location, thus potentially her mobility pattern during a day.
Per Destination Privacy Leakage. We further investigate
how the private data could be collected by a single destination
(e.g., an advertiser’s server) through multiple apps. We identify
22 “common” destinations(i.e., the destinations receiving data
from more than one app) in 19 categories. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁnd that three Google destinations collect 7 types of private
data from more than 30 applications. Figure 2 shows that
during one day’s testing of the 97 applications, most of the
22 destinations collect more than 3 types of private data, and
Google is the most active one among these destinations.
Privacy Leakage Frequency. During our testing, we ﬁnd
that the Location and IMEI are the ﬁrst and second most
common privacy leakage types, which involves 71 and 61
applications respectively. We present the leakage count de-
composition of 28 apps that leaks more than 10 times in its 5-
minute usage in Figure 3. We observe that 7 apps have leaked
more than 4 types of private information, 3 of them have
even leaked all 7 types of private information (i.e., Pandora
Jewelry, Carphone Mobile Superhero, and Evernote). These
results indicate that an advertiser has a comprehensive view
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Fig. 3. Privacy leakage counts of apps leaking more than 10 times in a
5-minute continuous testing.
of the users’ private data through their daily phone usage. Thus
it can potentially use the combination of private data (such as
IMEI and NET-based location) to identify the location of the
user from such apps, and further obtain a ﬁne-grained picture
of the user’s social life with the assistance of the leaked contact
information.
Leakage to Common Destinations. We take a closer look
at the leakage frequency from different apps to a “common”
destination. We observe that WeatherBug and Jackass Fans
are the top two apps with the most frequent leakages: they
leak about 80/70 times during the 5 minute period. We further
summarize the leakage frequency in app categories to common
destinations and observe that the Weather category exhibits the
highest privacy leakage frequency, partly due to their needs
to know the user’s location, and the Social category is the
second. This again conﬁrms that various apps leak private
information to multiple common destinations, which allows
the advertiser to piece together the user’s social picture at ﬁne
temporal granularity through multiple apps.
IV. USER PRIVACY LEAKAGE MODELING AND
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
The run-time privacy leakage study provides a comprehen-
sive analysis on how much private data and advertiser can
collect and aggregate from multiple apps, which serves as the
basis for the formulation of the privacy leakage inference from
multiple apps and across users. In this section, we present a
privacy leakage inference framework that quantiﬁes to what
extent an advertiser can learn and infer users’ relationships.
We then run real experiments with multiple participants to
analyze the consequences of the privacy leakage from the ad-
vertiser’s perspective and abstract privacy leakage user proﬁles
based on the experiments.
A. Privacy Leakage Modeling
We ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of connection. A connection
between two users exists if the same type of privacy leakage
from the two users share certain spatial, temporal or content
similarities. A few examples are:
Contact list: A connection instance exists between two users
if they are in each other’s contact list, or they share common
contacts. (However, we note that contact lists are not sufﬁcient
for social relationship inference simply because a person does
not necessarily have close relationship with everyone in his or
her contact list.)
Wi-Fi Access Point list: A connection instance exists be-
tween two users when they share common leaked access points
at the same time.
GPS location: A connection instance exists between two
users if two GPS locations leaked around the same time are
close by within a certain threshold.
Network-based location: A connection instance exists be-
tween two users if the leaked network-based locations are close
by within a certain threshold around the same time.
The connection bridges the gap between the privacy leakage
information and the users’ relationship inference. In particular,
to quantify the consequences of the privacy leakage from
the advertiser’s perspective, we design a privacy leakage
inference framework, which consists of three virtual layers:
Privacy Leakage Aggregation, User Connection Derivation,
and Relationship Inference as shown in Figure 4.
Such a framework facilitates us to perform a system-
atic study to understand the advertiser’s perspective of user
privacy: (1) The Privacy Leakage Aggregation layer deals
with the raw privacy leakage information. An advertiser can
combine the privacy leakage data from multiple apps across
different users over time. For example, the users can be
identiﬁed by the IMEI or phone number. The aggregated
privacy leakage data of each user can then be categorized into
different types, such as contact list, AP list, GPS location,
and Network location. (2) In the User Connection Derivation
layer, the advertiser correlates the data from different users and
identiﬁes connections 1 between any two users. By correlating
different types of privacy leakages across the users over time,
the connection frequency between any two users can be de-
rived. (3) In the Relationship Inference layer, the user’s social
and community relationships, such as family, colleagues and
friends, are inferred based on the connections between users.
The type of relationship is usually determined by examining
the temporal and spacial patterns of the connections (e.g.,
family members usually have connections at home in the
morning and at night, whereas colleagues have connections in
ofﬁce during working hours). We next conduct an experiment
to study the effectiveness of our privacy leakage model using
this framework.
B. Experimental Study
1) Design of Experiments: Our experiment involves 10
volunteer students and their family members over one month
period, among which ﬁve types of relationships exist: col-
league, collaborator, classmate, friend, and family. To clar-
ify, collaborators are usually colleagues that actively work
together, usually at regular times such as weekly meetings. We
developed a tool to capture the privacy leakage information
in real-time leveraging TaintDroid. During the experiments,
we distribute smartphones to volunteers with the tool and
the top 10 popular apps (across 19 categories in Google
Play) installed. Because the experimental smartphones are not
replacements of the volunteers’ regular phones, they are asked
to use their experimental smartphones at least three times a
1We use “connections” to refer to connection instances later in the paper.
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Fig. 4. Privacy leakage inference framework with three virtual layers to
quantify the advertiser’s perspective of smartphone user privacy.
day. The volunteers are also encouraged to use whichever
apps they are interested in without knowing the purpose of
this experiment. After the experiments we extract the leaked
privacy data logged by our tool to quantify to what extent an
advertiser can infer a user’s relationships.
2) Observations: User Connection Derivation. Figure 5
shows one example on the temporal patterns of the derived
user connections at a residential area based on GPS location
leakage. In particular, subject1 and subject2 have frequent con-
nections in the morning (around 10AM) and at night (through
9PM-2AM) at a residential area. The advertiser can thus
infer the two subjects most likely have a family relationship.
Additionally, the advertiser can also infer subjects’ other social
relationship, such as colleagues, collaborators, and friends,
based on the spatial and temporal patterns of connections
extracted from privacy leakages over time.
Deﬁnition of Two Types of Social Relationships. From the
experimental results, we observe that while some relationships
(e.g., family, colleagues, collaborators, and classmates) exhibit
repetitive connection patterns, some others like friends do
not. This is because family and colleague based relationships
naturally carry similar spatial-temporal patterns dictated by the
relationship. For example, families live together at night while
colleagues work together during the day, whereas friendship
does not necessarily carry such inherent patterns. Two friends
that do not hang out for a while are still friends. We distinguish
these two categories of relationships as Fact Based Rela-
tionship and Intelligence Based Relationship, which covers
traditional social relationships. The Fact-based Relationship
includes colleagues, classmates, roommates, families that carry
inherit similar, regular and repetitive spatial-temporal con-
nection patterns as dictated by the relationship, whereas the
Intelligence-based Relationship includes friends, which do not
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Fig. 5. Example of location leakage patterns of family relationship.
necessarily carry such patterns.
C. Making Inference based on Thresholding
We next investigate how accurate an advertiser could infer
about the user’s social relationship such as colleagues, families
and friends by utilizing connections between users derived
from different types of privacy leakages.
We use a threshold-based approach to derive relationships
based on the connections between users extracted from privacy
leakage aggregation at the advertisement provider. If the con-
nection count between two users exceeds a certain threshold
in an observation window, we consider some relationship
exists. Our framework utilizes the temporal and spatial patterns
of the connections to classify the type of relationship: the
connections of colleagues occur in work hours of weekdays,
families in early morning and late night, while friends after
working time and in weekends.
These simple rules may not be entirely reliable. Neverthe-
less, we show that an advertiser can make inference even with
such simple rules. We note that such temporal and spatial pat-
terns of the connections are the basis to statistically generate a
user’s privacy leakage proﬁle, which will be described in the
next subsection.
In total we have 10 pairs of colleague relationship, 5 pairs of
collaborator relationship, 1 pair of family relationship, 2 pairs
of classmates, and 3 pairs of friend relationship among our 10
participants. That is 18 pairs of fact-based relationships and
3 pairs of intelligence-based relationships. During our experi-
ments, we observe that by utilizing connection frequencies and
patterns, an advertiser can infer over 90% social relationship
correctly.
D. Deriving Privacy Leakage User Proﬁles
Based on the experimental data collected over one month,
we next build the privacy leakage user proﬁle to statistically
capture the temporal and spatial patterns. We develop two
types of privacy leakage user proﬁle, activeness based proﬁle
and probability based proﬁle, which will be applied to our
large-scale trace-driven studies on advertiser’s perspective in
the next section.
1) Activeness Based Proﬁle: The activeness based proﬁles
are generated based on privacy leakages from each partici-
pant in our experiments and aim to capture the ﬁne-grained
statistical view of the privacy leakages.
Step 1. We ﬁrst derive the privacy leakage probability model
of a particular user. Assume there are N types of privacy
leakages observed in total. We divide the time in day d into
T time windows as {wt, t = 1, · · · , T}. Then within a time
window wt, a vector Φu,d,t is deﬁned to capture the numbers
of occurrences of different privacy leakage types, and each
element Φu,d,t(i)(i = 1, · · · , N) corresponds to the number
of times privacy leakage type i occurs. For example, when
Φu,d,t equals to [2, 1, 0], it means 2 occurrences of leakage
type 1, 1 occurrence of leakage type 2 and 0 occurrence of
leakage type 3 in time window Wt at day d for user u.
We then deﬁne γu,d,ti to indicate whether the privacy
leakage type i appears in the vector Φu,d,t as:
γ
u,d,t
i =
{
1,Φu,d,t(i) = 0
0,Φu,d,t(i) = 0.
(1)
The probability that type i leakage happens for user u in
time window wt across D days (e.g., D = 7 days) is deﬁned
as:
Prob
u,t
i =
∑D
d=1 γ
u,d,t
i
D
. (2)
Step 2. The number of occurrence of the privacy leakages
affects the inference of a user’s social community. Thus we
capture the frequency of type i privacy leakage using the
average number of occurrences over the days it happens in
time window wt across D days. Speciﬁcally, the average rate
r
u,t
i is deﬁned as:
r
u,t
i =
∑D
d=1Φ
u,d,t(i)∑D
d=1 γ
u,d,t
i
. (3)
The activeness based proﬁle of user u consists of Probu,ti
and ru,ti .
Example. We illustrate the generation of the activeness
based proﬁle of user u in Figure 6. We examine a privacy
leakage dataset across 7 days (i.e., one week) with the time
window wt set to 5 minutes and 288 time windows in total per
day. Assume 3 types of privacy leakage are under study. For
wt at day 2, if there are 2 occurrences of leakage type 2 and
8 occurrences of type 3 observed, we have Φu,2,t = [0, 2, 8]
and γu,2,t2 = 1 shown as the green eclipse in Figure 6. In
addition, if the leakage type 2 is only observed during day
1 and day 2 with Φu,1,t = [0, 5, 7] and Φu,2,t = [0, 2, 8],
the privacy leakage probability of type 2 privacy leakage in
time window wt across 7 days for user u can be calculated
using Equation (2) as: Probu,t2 = γ
u,1,t
2
+γ
u,2,t
2
+···+γ
u,7,t
2
7
=
1+1+···+0
7
= 0.286. And the corresponding average rate can be
obtained as: ru,t2 =
Φ
u,1
2
+Φ
u,2
2
+···+Φ
u,7
2
γ
u,1,t
2
+γ
u,2,t
2
+···+γ
u,7,t
2
= 5+2+···+0
1+1+···+0
= 3.5,
which is shown in blue rectangles in Figure 6.
Categorization. Once the activeness based user proﬁle is
obtained, the advertiser could further categorize the proﬁles
by the number of hours ku the user u has privacy leakages
in a one-day duration. There are three representative user
categories, namely active user category, regular user category,
and inactive user category. Assume two thresholding hours ρ1
and ρ2 with ρ1 > ρ2. If the user u has greater than ρ1 hours
with privacy leakages, his user proﬁle is put into the active
user category. If the user u has less than ρ1 but larger than
or equal to ρ2 hours with privacy leakages, his user proﬁle
is then added into the regular user category. When the user
u has less than ρ2 hours privacy leakages, his user proﬁle is
then captured in the inactive user category. The categorization
can be summarized as:
α =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 (active user category), if ku  ρ1;
2 (regular user category), if ρ2  ku < ρ1;
3 (inactive user category), if ku < ρ2.
(4)

 	

 




  
         	   
  
    
        
    	    
    
	 

		 
 
	 

     
     
     

  
 
Fig. 6. Example of activeness based proﬁle generation for user u with 3
types of privacy leakages when D = 7.
2) Probability Based Proﬁle: The {Probu,ti , ru,ti } in each
activeness based proﬁle captures the leakage of the corre-
sponding user u. To characterize the statistical average of
the leakages of users in the same category, we design the
probability based proﬁle. Activeness based proﬁles in the same
category are used to derive the leakage probability and rate for
the probability based proﬁle of that category.
Step 1. We ﬁrst deﬁne the δu,ti to indicate whether there is
a probability of type i leakage in the time window wt for the
proﬁle of user u as:
δ
u,t
i =
{
1, P robu,ti = 0
0, P robu,ti = 0.
(5)
Then we calculate the average probability that leakage type
i occurs in a time window for user u:
λui =
∑T
t=1 δ
u,t
i
T
. (6)
Step 2. We then deﬁne the leakage probability of that
category as the previous probability averaged over all users
of the same category.
Probαi =
∑Mα
u=1 λ
u
i
Mα
, (7)
where Mα is the number of users belonging to the category
α.
Step 3. The corresponding proﬁle privacy leakage rate is
calculated over all the users in one particular category α as:
rαi =
∑Mα
u=1
∑T
t=1 r
u,t
i∑Mα
u=1
∑T
t=1 δ
u,t
i
. (8)
The probability based proﬁle of a user category α then
consists of Probαi and rαi . Based on the data from our
experiments they can be calculated. We respectively name
them as high probability (Probαi = 0.87), medium probability
(Probαi = 0.68), and low probability (Probαi = 0.44) proﬁles.
Both types of proﬁles quantify the users’ privacy leakage
characteristics: the leakage probability Probu,ti , P robαi deter-
mine whether type i privacy leakage happens or not in a time
window, whereas the average leakage rate ru,ti , rαi determine
the number of type i leakages in that time window should they
happen at all. The proﬁles will be used in our large-scale trace-
drive studies in the next section to facilitate the understanding
of the user relationship inference from the advertiser’s point
of view.
V. SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP INFERENCE LEVERAGING
PRIVACY LEAKAGES
In this section, we systematically study the consequence
of the privacy leakages obtained by advertisers by applying
the privacy leakage model to two human mobility traces.
In particular, we study how much an advertiser can infer
about users’ social and community relationships by combining
privacy leakages from multiple apps and across many users.
We build a simulator utilizing the privacy leakage inference
framework to generate connections between users based on
both the leakage proﬁles derived from the previous section
and the human mobility traces. The human mobility traces
are used to discover connections between users in both an
academia and a city environment.
A. Methodology
1) Human mobility traces: We use two human mobility
traces: the Foursquare trace [18], and the MIT trace [17],
which come from different backgrounds and have various re-
lationships. Speciﬁcally, the MIT trace represents participants
with similar background in an academia environment, where
user relationships mostly represent research colleagues, ofﬁce
staff and classmates. In the Foursquare trace, participants have
more diverse relationships; they may be colleagues, friends,
and families in a city environment. The details of these two
traces are introduced below:
Foursquare Trace. Foursquare is a company that helps
people share life experiences based on locations such as restau-
rants. This trace is generated based on tipping information
collected from different venues in Los Angeles (LA). A tip in a
venue shows that one participant has carried out some essential
activities (like dinning and shopping) at that venue. There
are 104, 478 tips left by 31, 544 participants in this trace. We
choose 354 participants from the top 10 venues (which are all
restaurants) to generate encounter events between participants
based on the time of the tipping in a 21 day duration.
MIT Trace. This trace is collected on MIT campus for 10
months by 107 participants with smartphones. Each smart-
phone scans (using Bluetooth) and records nearby smartphones
every ﬁve minutes. The encounter happens when two partici-
pants are located in close physical proximity (e.g., shown in
the Bluetooth scanned neighboring list in MIT Trace). And
such an event is deﬁned as an encounter event. There are 97
participants with valid data including staffs and students. In
our study, we use 21 days’ data which includes 91 participants
for social relationship inference.
2) Privacy Leakage Proﬁle Population: To understand the
impact of user proﬁles, we repeat the study using both
activeness and probability based proﬁles. When activeness
based ones are used, each participant is assigned a randomly
selected proﬁle in the chosen category (i.e., active, regular
and inactive). When probability based ones are used, each
participant is assigned the same probability proﬁle (i.e., one of
high, medium and low). When presenting our results, we will
use terms like “active users” or “users of medium probability”
to (loosely) refer to participants assigned of the activeness or
probability based proﬁles.
We then infer relationship based on connections derived
from the leakages over observation windows of different sizes
(i.e., 7, 14 and 21 days). From real experiments with 10
participants having known relationships, we ﬁnd that different
thresholds of connection counts in the observation window
should be applied to derive different relationships. We thus use
3 days for fact-based relationship and 2 days for intelligence-
based relationship in both experiments and simulations. Such
thresholds enable an advertiser to achieve over 90% inference
accuracies for regular users with very small false positive rates,
which is a good balance between the two.
Foursquare Trace. In order to apply privacy leakage proﬁles
to this dataset, we generate encounter events between partic-
ipants as follows: for a particular venue, we give a visiting
duration with a random length ranging from 30 minutes to 2
hours to each tipping user. In the overlapped period of the
duration of two users, we generate encounter events with a
ﬁxed time interval of 30 minutes (e.g., in an 1 hour overlapped
period, we generate 2 encounter events). For each encounter
event, we ﬁrst ﬁnd out corresponding 5-minute time windows.
Then we ﬂip a coin with the privacy leakage probability in
the users’ proﬁle (deﬁned in Equation (2) or (7)) to decide
whether privacy leakages should happen or not in that 5-
minute time window. If they do, we use the privacy leakage
rate deﬁned in Equation (3) or (8) as the number of leakages
revealed to the advertiser in that particular 5-minute time
window. The leakages are used by the advertiser to derive
connections and eventually encounter events to infer users’
relationship.
MIT Trace. The MIT trace records encounter events for
each user every 5 minutes. Therefore, we use the same way
as we introduced for the Foursquare trace to populate privacy
leakages among users in the MIT trace based on users’
encounter events.
B. Metrics
In our evaluations, we study the inference accuracy of
pairwise social relationship and the correlation between social
communities extracted based on the connections of users.
Inference accuracy. This is the ratio between the success-
fully inferred relationship pairs and all relationship pairs.
Community correlation. This is the ratio between the com-
mon subjects within a community identiﬁed by our privacy
leakage inference framework and the total number of subjects
within the community.
False positive rate. This is the ratio between the number of
mistakenly identiﬁed members of inferred community and the
total number of members within the inferred community.
C. Inference with Privacy Leakages
1) Combination of Privacy Leakages: As we discussed in
the previous section, an advertiser can utilize the temporal
and spatial patterns of connections to infer users’ relation-
ship. There are multiple privacy leakages that can produce
connections between users. In this study we focus on the
{user identity, location} combinations of most popular privacy
leakages including IMEI, phone number, GPS location, Wi-Fi
AP list, and network-based location.
2) Pairwise Social Relationship Inference: Figure 7 com-
pares the accuracy of pairwise social relationship inference
(for both fact and intelligence based relationships) by applying
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Fig. 7. Inference accuracy, MIT mobility trace, (a) and (b) are from the
activeness based proﬁles, (c) and (d) are from the probability based proﬁles.
activeness and probability based proﬁles to the MIT trace
under different sizes of observation windows. We use 3 days
and 2 days as the threshold for fact-based and intelligence-
based relationship inference respectively, which is introduced
in the previous section (same threshold applies hereafter). The
fact-based relationship has greater threshold because people
having fact-based relationships are supposed to encounter
each other more regularly than those having intelligence-
based relationships (e.g., colleagues meet 3 days a week while
friends meet 1 day a week).
From Figure 7 (a) and (b) we observe that for most cases, an
advertiser can achieve over 80% inference accuracy for fact-
based relationships with regular users, whereas it is around
60% for intelligence-based relationships. We also observe
that the inference accuracy decreases for less active users,
which is reasonable since less usage leads to less privacy
leakages. In addition, for active users, Figure 7 shows that
the inference accuracy for both fact-based relationship and
intelligence relationship is high (i.e., above 90%).
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that longer observation windows help
improve the inference accuracy, especially when the privacy
leakage probability is low. This is observed in the probability-
based approach shown in Figure 7 (c) and (d). It is because a
longer window helps the advertiser to accumulate more data,
resulting in more connections to identify users’ relationships.
Comparing Figure 7 (a) and (b) to Figure 7 (c) and (d)
respectively, we observe that the inference accuracy of active
users is similar to that of users have the proﬁle with a high
leakage probability. Figure 7 (d) suggests that in order to keep
the inference accuracy of intelligence based relationship lower
than 0.6, the user has to keep his leakage probability smaller
than low probability (i.e., 0.44).
Examining the Foursquare trace, we observe much higher
inference accuracy for both fact and intelligence based rela-
tionships. We show the results using privacy leakage proﬁle
with different activeness in Figure 8 (a) and (b). Even for
inactive users, the inference accuracy is about 70% for a 7-
day window, and it goes over 95% for the 14-day window.
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Fig. 8. Inference accuracy, Foursquare mobility trace, (a) and (b) are from the
activeness based proﬁles, (c) and (d) are from the probability based proﬁles.
This is because users in the Foursquare trace encounter each
other more frequently than those in the MIT trace. Thus, more
connections can be discovered when the users have the same
intensity of app usage, leading to a higher inference accuracy.
This is also the case when using the probability-based proﬁle
to infer pairwise relationship with the Foursquare trace, as
shown in Figure 8 (c) and (d).
3) Social Community Inference: We next study how the
social community could be inferred by the advertiser using
the privacy leakage proﬁle. In particular, based on the in-
ferred pairwise social relationships, a hierarchical clustering
algorithm [25] is applied to obtain the social communities of
users with similar relationships (e.g., collaborators, labmates,
and classmates).
Community Correlation. We present the community corre-
lations of both fact based relationship and intelligence based
relationship when activeness and probability based proﬁles are
applied to the Foursquare trace in Figure 9. We observe that
the intelligence based community correlation is high for active
users and regular users (i.e., over 80% on average). Similarly it
is high for users with high probability and medium probability
proﬁles (i.e., over 90%). However, the community correlation
of users having the fact-based relationship is much lower with
inactive users and users with low probability proﬁles (i.e.,
ranges from 10% to 60%). This is because participants in
Foursquare data are from much diverse background in the city
environment and the locations are mostly restaurants which
favors more to the intelligence-based relationship inference.
Furthermore, we observe that the community correlation also
increase with longer observation windows, especially for reg-
ular users and inactive users. This is also because longer
observation windows help the advertiser to aggregate more
connections between users, which helps to more accurately
identify their social communities. Since MIT trace has similar
result, we do not provide ﬁgures for MIT trace due to the
limited space.
Discussion of False Positive. Table I shows false positive
rate of community correlation for both MIT and Foursquare
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Fig. 9. Community correlation, Foursquare dataset, (a) and (b) are from the
activeness based proﬁles, (c) and (d) are from the probability based proﬁles.
traces. Overall, the false positive rate is very small (i.e.,
the average is around 0.04). In addition, larger observation
window results in smaller false positive rates. This is because
longer observation window includes more information and
thus can improve the inference performance. Furthermore, we
observe that the Foursquare trace has much lower false positive
rate than the MIT trace. This is because the Foursquare trace
has more connections, thus leads to lower false positive rate.
To brieﬂy summarize the major ﬁndings, 1) the advertiser
can infer users’ social relationships at high accuracy, e.g., over
90% on average for active users and over 80% on average
for regular users; 2) the advertiser can also infer a signiﬁcant
portion of users’ community relationships, e.g., over 90% on
average for active users and over 60% on average for regular
users, which reveals common interests or activities among
users not necessarily with direct interactions.
VI. DISCUSSION
More Types of Private Data. There are potentially other
types of private data available to advertisers. For example,
Google has the access to its search terms and histories of
many users. Although we do not ﬁnd the 190 apps studied
Fact-based Intelligence-based
7days 14days 21days 7days 14days 21days
MIT Trace
Active users 0.035 0.022 0.016 0.149 0.129 0.098
Regular users 0 0 0 0.065 0 0
Inactive users 0 0 0 0.056 0 0
High prob. 0.069 0.054 0.052 0.17 0.145 0.129
Medium prob. 0.045 0.041 0.039 0.104 0.093 0.084
Low prob. 0.026 0.016 0.015 0.055 0.037 0.0257
Foursquare Trace
Active users 0 0 0 0.019 0.076 0.076
Regular users 0 0 0 0.081 0.061 0.052
Inactive users 0 0 0 0.04 0.038 0.029
High prob. 0 0 0 0.19 0.078 0.078
Medium prob. 0 0 0 0.183 0.078 0.078
Low prob. 0 0 0 0.099 0.064 0.058
TABLE I
FALSE POSITIVE RATE FOR COMMUNITY CORRELATION: MIT TRACE AND
FOURSQUARE TRACE.
leaking text message logs, audio and video data, illegitimate
access and disclosure of such information are not impossible.
Our current study is based on the combination of most basic
privacy leakages (i.e., identities and locations). Contact list
carries important information. For example, a certain relation-
ship most likely exists when two users share many common
contacts. Unfortunately, because we do not have the contact
lists of the subjects of the two mobility traces, we are not
able to evaluate its impact on relationship inference. Studying
the impact of more types of private data would be interesting
future work.
Large Scale Evaluation. We are aware that our experiments
(due to limited available manpower) may cause bias to our
privacy leakage proﬁles and the evaluation may not cover
all privacy leakage patterns in the real world. Increasing
the number of participants in real experiments and building
more sophisticated privacy leakage proﬁles are our future
exploration as well.
Insufﬁcient Metadata. Our evaluation is constrained by the
availability of metadata descriptions of datasets. Neither the
MIT nor Foursquare data has sufﬁcient annotation to differen-
tiate the relationships among users at ﬁne granularity desired
by us: colleague, collaborator, classmate, friend, and family.
In lieu of that, we have to utilize the most commonly used
technique for detecting social communities (i.e., hierarchical
clustering algorithm [25]) and use the results as the base of
comparison, which is a common practice in social relationship
research. In the future we hope such metadata would be made
available when people conduct such experiments.
More Advanced Inference Algorithms. The thresholding
algorithm that we use to infer relationships is based on quite
simple heuristics. With the availability of large amount of data,
advertisers can use more advanced inference algorithms, e.g.,
by utilizing data mining techniques. We are aware of this
limitation and plan to build advanced models more closely
describing general cases.
VII. RELATED WORK
In response to the widespread popularity of smartphones,
much attention has been paid in studying application security
and user privacy related issues. Extensive security analysis on
smartphone apps has been carried out and can be categorized
into permission analysis, static analysis, and dynamic analysis
[3], [5], [6], [10], [13], [15], [26]–[31].
Enck et al. [10] propose Kirin, which is the ﬁrst to per-
form inspection on Android API permissions during the app
installation time to identify dangerous functionalities. Barrera
et al. [5] report many applications request only a small set of
permissions based on the permission analysis of top 1,100 free
applications. Felt et al. [6] study over 900 applications from
the Android Market and ﬁnd INTERNET permission is the
most frequently requested. They later propose Stowaway [9]
to detect over-privilege in applications and report 10 most
common unnecessary permissions.
Static analysis analyzes the code of applications to infer
what can happen to users’ security. For example, PiOS [26]
analyzes compiled Objective-C code to identify information
leaks on the iOS platform, whereas ComDroid [27] uses dis-
assembled DEX bytecode to identify vulnerabilities in Intent
communication between applications. Enck et al. further pro-
pose the ded decompiler [32] to reverse Android applications
to Java code for security analysis.
Some work has been done in dynamic analysis. Taint-
Droid [3] tracks the ﬂow of privacy sensitive data and reports
when sensitive data leaves the system via interfaces such
as network connections. D2Taint [15] tracks detailed private
leakage sources at runtime in multiple classes and detects
leakages from any of these sources rapidly. Agarwal et al. [11]
proposes ProtectMyPrivacy (PMP) which utilizes a crowd-
sourcing based mechanism to help users decide proper privacy
settings for iOS apps. AppIntent [29] tracks the sequence
of events leading to private data transmission, which helps
to determine whether it is user intended or not. Zhang and
Yin [30] develop Capper that can track privacy information
and detect leakage at run time by inserting instrumentation
code into apps. Our work takes a different viewpoint by
systematically analyzing what privacy sensitive information
the advertiser can collect and aggregate at run-time from
multiple apps and infer the social relationship of a user. We
utilizes TaintDroid as a tool to track and log the run-time
privacy leakage from apps.
Finally, some work develops smartphone platform based
privacy protection mechanisms, for example MockDroid [12],
TISSA [14], NativeGuard [31], and AppFence [19]. Our work
focuses on a different aspect of gaining systematic understand-
ing on the social relationship inference consequences from
the privacy leakage by an advertiser. Such understanding may
motivate the user to adjust app usage pattern or adopt defense
mechanisms to control the sensitive data leakage.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Privacy leakage by smartphone apps has attracted signiﬁcant
research efforts in recent years. The community has proposed
various defense mechanisms, from permission management,
code analysis, to obfuscated data. Nevertheless, the charac-
teristics of apps’ run-time privacy leakage behavior is still
not well investigated, and the consequences of such privacy
leakages have not attracted much attention. This paper serves
as the ﬁrst step towards a comprehensive understanding of
the advertiser’s perspective. In particular, we seek to discover
what an advertiser can infer about users’ social and community
relationships by combining private data from many apps. Our
analysis on the run-time privacy leakage behavior of nearly
200 most popular apps from 19 categories of Google Play
shows that dominant advertisers can easily gather data from
many apps. We propose a privacy leakage inference framework
that describes a general method for inferring users’ social
and community relationships. Our experimental study over
one month demonstrates that an advertiser can infer 90%
of users’ social relationship correctly using simple heuristics.
This observation is further conﬁrmed by human mobility trace
driven studies of two large scale data sets. We hope our work
will eventually lead to a complete picture of the advertiser’s
perspective.
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